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A B S T R A C T
The process of social engineering targets people rather than IT infrastructure. Attackers use
deceptive ploys to create compelling behavioural and cosmetic hooks, which in turn lead a
target to disclose sensitive information or to interact with a malicious payload.The creation
of such hooks requires background information on targets. Individuals are increasingly re-
leasing information about themselves online, particularly on social networks.Though existing
research has demonstrated the social engineering risks posed by such open source intelli-
gence, this has been accomplished either through resource-intensive manual analysis or via
interactive information harvesting techniques. As manual analysis of large-scale online in-
formation is impractical,and interactivemethods riskalerting the target,alternativesaredesirable.
In this paper, we demonstrate that key information pertinent to social engineering attacks
on organisations can be passively harvested on a large-scale in an automated fashion.We
address two key problems.We demonstrate that it is possible to automatically identify em-
ployees of an organisation using only information which is visible to a remote attacker as
a member of the public. Secondly, we show that, once identified, employee profiles can be
linked across multiple online social networks to harvest additional information pertinent
to successful social engineering attacks.We further demonstrate our approach through analy-
sis of the social engineering attack surface of real critical infrastructure organisations. Based
on our analysis we propose a set of countermeasures including an automated social engi-
neering vulnerability scanner that organisations can use to analyse their exposure to potential
social engineering attacks arising from open source intelligence.
© 2017 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the
CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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1. Introduction
Social engineering attacks pose a major risk to the security of
organisations. Some of the most high profile cyber attacks on
large organisations, e.g., RSA, JP Morgan, AT&T, the Ukranian
power grid, etc., leveraged social engineering as an entry point
into the organisation’s systems. Attackers use a number of
tactics, ranging from simple impersonation to complex multi-
layered deceptions worthy of a Hollywood caper, that lead a
target to disclose sensitive information or to interact with a
malicious payload. At their most basic, these attacks may be
represented by a generic phishing email from an unfamiliar
sender that targets hundreds of staff within an organisation
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with the samemessage.More sophisticated attacks may greatly
increase their chance of success by targeting a much smaller
pool of recipients with a personalised ploy (Jagatic et al., 2007).
Current research suggests that the effectiveness of such
attacks can be greatly increased through the use of open source
intelligence (OSINT) to boost the effectiveness of the decep-
tive ploys delivered in an attack (Jagatic et al., 2007). Such open
source information is now widely available – with individu-
als increasingly releasing information about themselves online,
particularly on social networks. Even more worryingly, prac-
tices such as organisational engagement with social media and
the publication of employee rosters on organisational web-
sites are enabling attackers to easily identify an organisation’s
employees from amongst millions of social media users. This
lets attackers know exactly who to target for data harvesting
in preparation for an attack on the organisation. Methods by
which such OSINT data may be used to increase effective-
ness in this manner include (but are not limited to): selection
of vulnerable personalities, inclusion of ploys personally at-
tractive to the target, and impersonation of a person in authority
(Huber et al., 2009).
Existing research has demonstrated the social engineer-
ing risks posed by such OSINT data (Ball et al., 2012). However,
this normally relies on labour intensive manual analysis (Creese
et al., 2012), which is impractical and poses a high cost to a
potential attacker. Alternatively, such techniques utilise auto-
mated conversational agents (Huber et al., 2009), which do not
scale and are not very effective due to the challenges of imi-
tating human conversational behaviour. Other techniques rely
on “active” engagement with potential targets to elicit infor-
mation – through zombie profiles or misleading friend requests
(Scheelen et al., 2012) – and hence risk detection prior to an
attack being launched. In this paper, we demonstrate that both
of these challenges – automation and passive information gath-
ering – can be overcome, posing major social engineering risks
to organisations.
We show that it is possible to automatically identify the
employees of an organisation amongst individuals within its
online footprint. Furthermore, we demonstrate that it is
possible to automatically resolve employee identities across
multiple online social networks, with a high accuracy, for
large-scale harvesting of information pertinent to launching
social engineering attacks. We also show that such harvest-
ing can be undertaken “passively”without resorting to invasive
measures, enabling vulnerability assessments which do not
rely on exercising deception during social engineering pen-
etration tests. Through automated identification of OSINT
that may be used to conduct or enhance a social engineering
attack against an organisation, we aim to highlight potential
risks to the target, allowing appropriate mitigation tech-
niques to be selected.
The key contributions of our work are as follows:
• In-depth interviews were conducted with expert social en-
gineering penetration testers to better understand the variety
of social engineering attacks used, and how OSINT data fa-
cilitate the attacks.A summary of the valuable insights from
these interviews is presented in Section 3.
• We present an automated approach for identifying the em-
ployees of an organisation from amongst the many
connected profiles in online social networks. So far as we
are aware, no previous work exists on the topic of auto-
matically identifying – from only public data – which of an
organisation’s social media followers are actually its em-
ployees. The nearest approximation we are aware of is
Scheelen et al. (2012), who investigated a single company
by connecting with followers on LinkedIn, where the social
media structure is based around employment.
• We present an approach for automated resolution of iden-
tities across social media – demonstrating that large-scale
harvesting of such information is feasible for attackers.While
employees may be careful about their presentation in online
profiles linked to their work identity, we identify features
that can be used to link profiles on different online social
networks.We present an ensemble classifier, which makes
its decision about whether two profiles can be matched
based on the reported matches of sub-classifiers working
on specific profile features.While more advanced methods
exist which could producemore accurate comparison results
for each feature, we employ unsupervised methods which
release us from the requirement of obtaining training
data for the subclassifiers and which are relatively
computationally inexpensive.
• We provide an analysis of the online footprints of 13 criti-
cal infrastructure companies, demonstrating the extent of
their vulnerability to social engineering attacks based on
employee information in online social media.We discover
that material sufficient to launch sophisticated email and
phone attacks targeted at employees is automatically reach-
able for all but one of the examined organisations.
• We propose a number of mitigation strategies and make
our approach – an automatic social engineering vulnerabil-
ity scanner – available for organisations to counter such
risks.1
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. In Section 2
we discuss related work connecting OSINT and social engi-
neering. In Section 3 we summarise the findings from in-
depth interviews with social engineering professionals. In
Section 4.1 we demonstrate how automated methods can be
deployed to identify a company’s employees from amongst
its followers on Twitter, while in Section 4.2 we detail and
evaluate our probabilistic identity resolution system on pro-
files from across four major online social networks (OSNs). In
Section 5 we go on to present the results of automated
analysis on the digital footprints of critical infrastructure
organisations. Section 6 presents the final product of the
research as a vulnerability scanner and mitigation tool, evalu-
ating its performance with five companies. In Section 7 we
discuss our results and reflect on the implications for social
engineering penetration testing and organisational practices
for online security. We draw conclusions and offer sugges-
tions for future work in Section 8.
1 Available from: https://github.com/Betawolf/social-vuln-
scanner.
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2. Related work
2.1. OSINT and social engineering
A small number of related studies make general efforts at using
OSINT to find social engineering vulnerabilities.
Huber et al. (2009) make use of an organisation’s Face-
book presence to automatically identify and target its
employees.Their tool gathers public information on members
from Facebook, then attempts to expand that information
through mechanisms like friend requests. Theoretically, their
tool then uses Facebook chat to act as a chat-bot, building a
rapport before executing a predefined attack (e.g., sending a
link). Their evaluation shows that this scheme is impractical
due to the overhead associated with imitating a human con-
versational partner.
Our approach also involves collecting information on em-
ployees using the organisation’s social media footprint, though
our search is across multiple online services rather than one,
including the business-oriented LinkedIn and the up-to-the-
second Twitter as well as Facebook and Google+. Rather than
the invasive chat procedure, our system expands its profile of
targets passively, through wider searches for a target’s online
presence.
Ball et al. (2012) detail how open source information can
be used to construct spear-phishing attacks on an organisation’s
employees. They manually mine employee information from
an organisation’s website and gather additional information
using the Maltego toolkit, before then using the Simple Phish-
ingToolkit to create phishing emails based on each employee’s
interests.
The approach of Ball et al. demonstrates the value of OSINT
in this domain, but their method still relies on significant
manual workload, whereas we focus on methods which can
be deployed as part of a completely automated scanner.
Scheelen et al. (2012) attempt to map out a company’s struc-
ture from online sources, including gathering information for
social engineering. In their method, they first connect to the
company on LinkedIn and then crawl LinkedIn for a list of em-
ployees, then search Facebook for those employees, matching
on name, profile picture and location. They prune multiple
matches by sending friend requests from “zombie” profiles
which are designed so as to look relevant to the targeted
organisation. Their organisational mapping is based on heu-
ristic processing of self-reported roles in LinkedIn profiles.
In contrast to the connections and friend requests utilised
by Scheelen et al., our interaction with the target organisation
is entirely passive, leaving the target organisation unaware of
this stage of information-gathering.While we also resolve the
identities of employees, we do this through a more flexible
process using a larger and richer set of potential features, as
described in Section 4.2.2.
2.2. Identity resolution
As our design relies on resolving identities across different data
sources, existing literature on identity resolution is quite rel-
evant.A variety of methods have been applied in bothmatching
online identities from different social networks and in search-
ing for personal profiles given an existing profile of the same
person, examining a range of features.
Obvious features often work well: Perito et al. (2011) focused
on the identifiability of usernames. As well as contributing a
Markov modelling approach for estimating uniqueness of user-
names which suggested that they are on average highly unique
identifiers, they build and evaluate a classifier which links pro-
files based on username pairings, achieving good classification
accuracy, and suggesting that usernames are an ideal feature
for connecting profiles.
Combining features can also prove effective. Irani et al. (2009)
suggest that a record-matching approach to the problem can
be fruitful, with identifiers like last name, birth year and country
unlikely to change across records.Working with a wider range
of features, Malhotra et al. (2012) design an ensemble classi-
fier, with subclassifiers relying on individual features such as
profile pictures and usernames.
Social media profiles allow for additional information to be
exploited. Goga et al. (2013) exploit “innocuous” social media
profile information such as time-stamps, geographical loca-
tion and writing styles to match user profiles, demonstrating
that even where usernames and other traditional identifiers
are disguised, users can still be identified based on their usage
of the media. Our ownmethod follows from this general design,
using multiple subclassifiers on pictures, usernames, writing
style, social graphs, content and location.
In contrast to the above studies, where classifiers are trained
to connect profiles between two specific networks, our focus
is on a system which resolves identities between multiple net-
works, such that connections can be drawn between profiles
on all four of Google+, LinkedIn,Twitter and Facebook.We also
draw upon a more diverse feature set than many of the above
studies attempt, including not only location, name, image,
writing style and network features, but also a comparison of
user link sharing history, which has not to our knowledge been
explored previously.
2.3. Social engineering vulnerabilities
Our method relies on linking profiles, a practice which spe-
cifically ties to certain vulnerabilities. Linked profiles can be
particularly vulnerable to certain social engineering attacks.
Chen et al. (2012) detail some of these vulnerabilities, and dem-
onstrate that additional details such as phone numbers can
be better retrieved when multiple profiles of the target can be
linked.
As a complement to this, the absence of a profile on a certain
social media network can be a vulnerability in itself. Kontaxis
et al. (2011) describes the profile cloning attack which lets social
engineers use existing information on one person to imitate
them on a service on which they do not have an account, along
with a detection strategy for this.
More generally, there is a wide body of literature regard-
ing specific social engineering vulnerabilities. We focus our
attention on the most pressing social engineering channels
which rely on information available online. Krombholz et al.
(2013) provides a survey of such techniques which we take as
instructive in this regard. The general identity resolution ap-
proach of pairwise comparison is supported even more broadly
20 c om pu t e r s & s e cu r i t y 6 9 ( 2 0 1 7 ) 1 8 – 3 4
by similar approaches in other domains of security analytics
(Zhang et al., 2016).
3. Social engineering penetration testing
In order to better understand how OSINT is actually used in
real-world social engineering attacks we sought advice from
professional social engineering penetration testers. There are
only a small number of penetration testers who specialise in
social engineering, and most are based at large penetration
testing companies. Assisted by CREST,2 interview partici-
pants frommember companies were solicited for research into
the use of OSINT in social engineering engagements. Six pro-
fessionally qualified penetration testing experts,with knowledge
and experience in social engineering engagements, volun-
teered to be interviewed. Whilst this is a small number of
interviewees, the focus was on in-depth interviews with experts,
and a systematic analysis of responses. Our sample size is com-
parable to other qualitative studies (e.g. Ashenden and Sasse
2013), which uses 5 in-depth interviews with CISOs). Each in-
terviewee held internationally recognised certification in the
domain area, reaching a minimum level of “CREST CRT”, al-
lowing level of expertise to be compared and verified to
international standards (Knowles et al., 2016). Each interview
lasted 1 hour and 30 minutes.
Participants were asked to discuss their experience of social
engineering attack methodologies. At this stage of the study,
our aim was to determine the real-world attack vectors used
by social engineers, and understand their practicality for de-
ployment.This allows us to identify which techniques are more
often used, and those that would be preferred. Following this,
experts were questioned on the importance of OSINT data items
for each attack vector, and how much its collection was au-
tomated. This included identifying the essential data needed
to bootstrap an attack or payload, and the non-essential OSINT
data which can still contribute to the effectiveness of an attack.
Finally, the experts were asked for mitigation techniques for
the attack vectors discussed.
A key goal of the interviews was to determine the attack
vectors and OSINT data that are used in the real world, and
filter out the outliers that are rarely deployed effectively or are
embellished in literature as to their effectiveness. We sought
to identify techniques that are infrequently used at present,
but would see more use in real world attacks, should current
tools be enhanced to remove difficulties, such as automated
passive collection of data, as suggested in this paper.
3.1. Attack methodologies
The expert social engineers consistently identified the follow-
ing as the attack vectors used in real-world engagements:
• Email: phishing/spear-phishing emails that were used toma-
nipulate a target into visiting amalicious website, or opening
a malicious file.
• Telephone: voice phishing or “vishing”, used to extract in-
formation directly or persuade a target into interacting with
a malicious website or previously delivered file.
• Physical: gaining physical access to an organisation’s site
or systems, through use of a deceptive pretext, or delivery
of physical media (e.g. drop of a USB stick).
In addition to these attack vectors, our six experts were
questioned about the use of online attacks, such as water-
holing (strategic compromise of a website known to be
frequented by target individuals), and the use of social network
sites as an attack vector. Such attack vectors were consid-
ered by most to be out of bounds in a contract penetration
test, due to reliance on services external to the customer,
risk of collateral damage, and invasion of employee privacy.
It was noted by the experts that such concerns were not
considered by criminals.
Experts were asked to evaluate each individual attack
method against the following criteria:
• Frequency of use: how often different attacks and decep-
tions are used in real-world engagements.
• Effectiveness: rate of success and detection.
• Efficiency: time requirement and level of automation.
Responses were largely consistent in the frequency of use
and effectiveness of attack methods used, in terms of rates of
success and detection of these attacks. However, it was clear
from discussions that success was often interpreted as an
overall objective of a penetration test, rather than an indi-
vidual attack; e.g., from 100 phishing emails sent, 10 may be
opened, but 1 may result in a successful compromise of the
organisation.
For email-based attacks, all interviewees stated that these
were frequently used (more so than any other attack vector),
and all but one claimed the method to be successful in the ma-
jority of cases, with low detection rates.The level of automation
and time frame varied, ranging from almost completely manual
to almost fully automated, and from a few hours in one af-
ternoon, to waiting weeks for a response.This reflects the wide
range of engagements social engineering penetration testers
are involved in.
For telephone-based attacks, 3 interviewees often em-
ployed this as an attack vector, 2 did around half of the time,
and 1 not all. The interviewees agreed that this was a
successful method the majority of the time, with at least one
set of credentials (or some other target information) gained
in most engagements. Detection rates reported varied dra-
matically, again depending on the exact nature of the attack
and the information sought. This was always done entirely
manually, with each call normally lasting 10–15 minutes
(except for one interviewee using much shorter phone calls
of less than a minute).
Physical access attacks were less often part of engage-
ments according to our experts, but still used quite commonly
(over 80% of engagements) in most cases (4/6). Success rates
ranged from 50% to above 90%, with detection rates reported
2 “CREST provides organisations wishing to buy penetration testing
services with confidence that the work will be carried out by quali-
fied individuals with up to date knowledge, skill and competence
of the latest vulnerabilities and techniques used by real attack-
ers” (http://www.crest-approved.org/about-crest/).
21c om pu t e r s & s e cu r i t y 6 9 ( 2 0 1 7 ) 1 8 – 3 4
as being low (except for one report of USB key drops).This was
always done entirelymanually,with engagements taking at least
a day, and sometimes up to a week.
3.2. OSINT usage
The main focus of the interviews was the use of OSINT data
for the attacks discussed. Following discussion of each attack
vector, experts were asked to detail OSINT items that facili-
tate it, highlighting whether they are essential to the attack
process (i.e. an attack cannot occur without this OSINT item),
or non-essential. For non-essential items, experts were asked
to discuss the degree to which each item contributed to, or ac-
centuated, the success of an attack. Where possible, experts
were asked to rate their perceived importance of non-essential
items, so as to provide a point of reference relative to the con-
tribution of other pieces of OSINT data.
Through these discussions, OSINT data items were pre-
liminarily separated into two key information types:
• Bootstrap: data which facilitate the attack, usually by al-
lowing targeting of an individual or group of individuals.
Consistently, experts reported that whilst target selection
focused on those individuals who might be most suscep-
tible to it, the focus was mainly to exclude individuals likely
to be less vulnerable, such as IT or security personnel.
• Accentuator: data items which are used to enhance the ef-
fectiveness of an attack, by adding real-world context to the
ploys, such as impersonation of a contact, or inclusion of
an event or activity known to be of interest to the target.
Accentuator items were rated (high, medium, or low) based
on the discussions and benchmarked by the ratings given
by experts, where appropriate.
In addition to the perceived importance of each item, experts
were asked to discuss the process of obtaining the OSINT data
items, focusing on time required and level of automation of
the process. In this manner we gained an understanding of the
resources required to extract each OSINT data item.To under-
stand the rank of importance of OSINT data items, perceived
importance to the attack process was compared to the re-
sources required to extract the data, in terms of time and level
of automation. In this manner, OSINT data that are easy to
obtain (i.e. fast and automated) were ranked more highly, than
on requiring increased resources to extract. Furthermore, we
are able to identify the level at which OSINT data contribute
to individual or multiple attack vectors, flagging those items
which bootstrap multiple attack vectors as more useful to an
attacker.
The various OSINT items identified by our experts and their
nature (as bootstrap or accentuator) are shown in Table 1. Boot-
strap (B) items are shown in red, whilst Accentuators (A) are
shown in yellow.
In terms of automation of the collection of OSINT data, it
was clear from the interviews that whilst there was consis-
tent use of some tools between organisations, allowing
automation of basic tasks, the penetration testers’ tool chains
varied greatly between companies, often relying on a pool of
scripts, produced in-house between penetration testers. Even
in cases where OSINT extraction tasks were highly auto-
mated, a high proportion of time spent by experts was focused
on verification of the automatically extracted information, prior
to its use in an attack.
To put these results into context, we present an
example scenario, illustrating how bootstrap data are
used to initiate the attack, and accentuator items increase
effectiveness.
Example spear phishing email attack:
Table 1 – Level of contribution of OSINT data to attack impact. B = Required to bootstrap an attack; A = accentuates an
attack.
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• An attacker wishes to deliver a malicious spreadsheet to
a member of staff within a company.
• HR and finance departments are chosen, due to the fre-
quency of working with this sort of file and minimal
presence of IT personnel.
• The attacker does not have direct email addresses of staff
members in the HR or Finance teams.
• Using an automated tool, the attacker locates the name (B)
of onemember of HR staff (B) from the company website, and
one name (B) from LinkedIn.
• Armed with this information and examples of other email
addresses from the company website, the attacker
is able to deduce the format for the suspected specific email
address (B) of the two members of HR staff (e.g.
firstinitial.lastname@company.com).
• The attacker emails the two employees, with a non-
malicious email, requesting legitimate information, to verify
the accuracy of the email addresses.
• Members of HR reply, verifying their email addresses and
providing the attacker with their email signature (A).
• Attacker sends a simple email to one target, containing a
malicious spreadsheet disguised as a HR recruitment plan.
The sender address of the email is spoofed to be the other
member of HR staff located by the attacker, and included
in the body of the email is the legitimate email signature
of the member of staff; both the familiar sender and their
email footer support the validity of the message.
During the high-profile social engineering attack on RSA,
a malicious Excel spreadsheet was sent to four members of
staff within the HR department, along with a simple request
stating “I forward this file to you for review. Please open this
file and view it”. Despite the email being flagged as junk, this
was sufficient enough for the recipient to open the attach-
ment and activate the remote access trojan hidden within the
malicious file, compromising the corporate network.
3.3. Mitigation techniques
Also discussed during the interviews were social engineering
mitigation strategies suggested to clients of penetration tests
during the reporting process. The following were mentioned
consistently.
Security Awareness training was recommended consis-
tently throughout our interviews as the key mitigation strategy
for all the attack vectors used in real world scenarios. It should
be provided by default by any organisation, and renewed regu-
larly. Training can help employees understand why a culture
of security is important, highlighting the importance of moni-
toring the information that is available about them online.
However, interviewees were consistently dismissive of the ef-
fectiveness of the online security awareness training courses
that are often the first port of call for companies, normally due
to economic restrictions. Instead, they advocated practical train-
ing of small groups of staff on real-world scenarios, tailored
to a particular organisation. Our participants highlighted that
pragmatic training given an organisational context familiar to
the trainees helped to avoid disengagement with training more
common to generic approaches and helped support growth of
a security culture within the organisation. To increase famil-
iarity of the training, it was suggested that it should follow a
social engineering penetration test, and incorporate the attacks
used on the company thus ensuring relatable scenarios and
maximising trainee engagement.
Revised security policies and practices: It is important to
promote a culture of security in the workplace; policies and
best practice guidance are significant tools for achieving this
aim. Social media usage policies may indicate what informa-
tion about their work employees are allowed to post online,
or what privacy and security settings should be in place. Se-
curity procedures during telephone calls (e.g. challenge and
response protocols for IT support calls requiring disclosure of
information) can prevent staff defaulting to disclosure
behaviours. These policies should be disseminated, and rein-
forced by annual security awareness training.
Network restrictions: An organisation may want to con-
sider blocking access to certain websites on corporate systems,
e.g. social network sites. Many or the interviewed industry pro-
fessionals also highlighted whitelisting sites as mitigation
techniques that are often recommended to organisations, due
to the frequent use of typo-squatted URLs in phishing/vishing
attacks. It was noted, however, that most organisations did not
follow the recommendation of whitelisting, due to issues of
practicality. Blacklisting of known malicious websites was sug-
gested by all participants, with several also recommending the
use of an automated domain name monitoring service, to alert
to new registrations of typo-squatted URLs that may indicate
an attack.
Company website review: The information on a company
website can be a treasure-trove for attackers. Potentially useful
information should be reviewed to assess the balance between
the need for the information being present, and whether it
poses a potential risk, e.g., whether it is necessary to have direct
contact information for all employees publicly available. Un-
fortunately, as identified, much of the information useful to
an attacker is that which is required to be disclosed as part
of normal business operations.
Further Social engineering penetration tests: Annual social
engineering penetration tests, followed by an ongoing pro-
gramme of staff education were suggested by all participants
as a key method of identifying vulnerabilities, and evaluation
of the effectiveness of other mitigation techniques over time.
Experts commented that the scope of penetration tests was
often limited in terms of access to personal employee infor-
mation, for reasons of ethics, blocking access to some of the
most useful OSINT data items shown in Table 1. Due to eco-
nomic restrictions, many penetration testers highlighted that
the duration of penetration tests was also often highly re-
stricted, leaving a minimal time for collection of OSINT data,
which may not be representative of a determined persistent
adversary. In these cases, white-box penetration testing was
suggested, so as to test the underlying security procedures in
the most time efficient manner.
3.4. Summary
From the data gathered from these interviews we are able to
rank potential real-world attacks by effectiveness and effi-
ciency.Armedwith knowledge of which OSINT data are required
to facilitate these attacks,which information contributes to their
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effectiveness, and an understanding of the ease with which
OSINT is obtained by an attacker, we can better understand
which pieces of OSINT data lead to vulnerabilities that can be
exploited. In the following sections we show that these OSINT
items can be found automatically to reveal an organisation’s
social engineering attack surface.
4. Automatically identifying employee
information
To automatically assess the vulnerability of an organisation’s
online presence with respect to the risky information items
listed in Table 1, two critical challenges must be overcome.
Firstly, the accounts of employees must be identified from
within the online footprint of the organisation, as employees
are the critical targets on which information is gathered. Sec-
ondly, extended information needs to be retrieved on these
employees. Both challenges are addressed in this section.3
The first major component, labelled in Fig. 1 as Target Reso-
lution, deals with identifying employees amongst organisation
affiliates. The second major component, labelled in Fig. 1 as
Target Expansion, deals with resolving possible matches for
targets in other social networks.
4.1. Distinguishing employees from social media
followers
Employees are likely to be a minority amongst the followers
of an organisation in online social networks. Business part-
ners, customers and competitors also interact with
organisations on social media, and effort invested into gath-
ering information on these accounts will be largely wasted
for the target-oriented social engineer, and by extension it
will be wasted for an automated system approximating
them for the purpose of a penetration test. The problem then
becomes as follows:
Given a profile of an organisation O, its set of employees OE and
set of social media profiles of affiliates OA who are linked to O through
its friends list or public interaction on social media, how can we select
from OA those profiles which belong in OE?
3 The analysis code for these experiments can be accessed at
https://github.com/Betawolf/panning-scripts.
Fig. 1 – Sequence diagram of scanning process.
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4.1.1. Data source
In attempting to evaluate performance of any method, we need
some source of ground truth data. Certain quarters of the busi-
ness world have helpful practices when it comes to revealing
employee information that can be helpful in this regard. The
Law Society indexes legal firms, with links to the websites of
a large number of these. From an organisation’s homepage, we
can often automatically derive two further values:
• the official Twitter account for the organisation; and
• a link to a “roster page” which lists the names, and some-
times positions, of employees of the organisation.
From theTwitter account for the organisation we can extract
the list of accounts for followers and followees – the affiliates
OA of the organisation. These profiles can be downloaded via
the Twitter API to be inspected for features indicating they
belong to OE.
From the roster pages we can extract the names of em-
ployees (using the Stanford NER tool (Finkel et al., 2005)). This
gives us a list of known employee names OE.
A dataset consisting of 17 companies, 3753 affiliate pro-
files and 448 employee names confirmed from roster pages was
extracted using this method, with an average of 221 affiliates
per company. The companies selected were drawn from the
first 500 companies in the Law Society’s index, filtering only
those which matched our requirements. For each affiliate, an
automatic string comparisonmethod was used to compare their
name to the appropriate roster list, allowing complete or partial
matches based on name components. Where this automatic
comparison found a match, the profile was flagged for manual
review to check that the individual was the same person. After
this stage, each affiliate is coded as either matching or not
matching the roster page. Only 20 such matches were
confirmed.
Features corresponding to those described below were also
calculated for each employer/affiliate pairing. For evaluation
purposes, the feature regarding whether an organisation’s
website refers to the name of a profile specifically excluded
the roster page being used to generate the ground truth.
4.1.2. Features
As we presume the external social engineer’s viewpoint, we
consider only features of the organisation and the affiliate’s
online footprint. There are a number of such features which
would be indicative of an employment relationship:
1. FollowedBy/Following
The specifics of the identified connection between the
organisation and the affiliate may be important in distinguish-
ing employees from non-employees. It is plausible, in networks
like Twitter where connections are unidirectional, that a
popular organisation may have many followers, but would be
more selective in the users which it follows. This distinction
may also work in reverse: bidirectional connections may also
distinguish employees from e.g. celebrities the company is
interested in, who would not be expected to reciprocate the
interest.
2. OnWeb
The organisation’s public website is, as ever, a rich source
of information for a social engineer. Many organisations host
a roster page on their website which reveals some or all of their
employees to the general public. Even amongst organisations
which do not host such a page, material such as press re-
leases and self-promotion text often incidentally refers to
employees by name. These names can be considered highly
identifiable for individuals connected to the organisation, though
there is also some reason to expect Type I errors due to, e.g.,
partner organisations and prominent customers also being in-
cidentally mentioned.
3. HasFirmName
Another revelatory area would be the identification of the
company in the profile text of the affiliate. Many profession-
als will state their employment status as a key part of their
identity (e.g. “Marketing Director at EXAMCORP”). However, this
behaviour is not necessarily uniformly adopted, and even where
it is adopted it can be challenging to automatically recognise
the information being sought; an organisation’s name can be
expressed in many forms, some of which may be unintuitive
abbreviations or acronyms.
4. MentionsEmployee/MentionsEmployer
Social media references may be indicative of a close con-
nection between profiles. This can take two forms: the
organisation referencing the employee’s handle or name in its
online posts (congratulation messages, for example) or else the
symmetrical case of the employee referencing the employ-
er’s name in their online posts. The issues with the previous
two items are both relevant here: employers may talk about
competitors, partners or customers as well as employees, and
employees may refer to their employer by an unintuitive name
or not at all.
5. FollowedMatches/FollowingMatches
The network topology of nodes can also be an indication
of closeness. Employees are likely to move in the same
circles as their employer organisation, and as such their
social media contacts lists may overlap more than those of
customers or competitors. This common topology could be
an especially useful identifier where name-based methods
are insufficient.
4.1.3. Method
Our aim is to build a classification system which separates em-
ployee from non-employee affiliates.We desire a solution which
can be readily implemented in an automated scanning tool and
the operation of which can be interpreted by a social engi-
neer to provide feedback. As such, we chose to apply a decision
tree classifier, using the features outlined above.
A C5.0 decision tree from the C50 R implementation (Kuhn
et al., 2015) was evaluated on a 90:10 training/test split of the
dataset using a cost matrix which penalised false positives.
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4.1.4. Results
The decision tree from a training iteration is reproduced below.
The most valuable feature was OnWeb – whether the af-
filiate’s name appears on the website outside of the roster page,
a negative or only partial match result here excluding a ma-
jority of non-employee affiliates. The following features were
whether the employee mentions the organisation’s name in
their profile text (HasFirmName) and then the topological data:
the number of users which both profiles are followed by and
following (FollowedMatches, FollowingMatches). Of interest here
is that large numbers of followed-by matches are actually a
negative predictor of employment – this may reflect a pattern
whereby competitor companies are followed by the same
userbase, so users which have the same followers as an
organisation are more likely competitors than employees.
A stratified ten-fold cross-validation using different por-
tions of the data for training and test sets produced an
average recall of 0.9 and precision of 0.58, which combine as
an overall f1-score of 0.65.4 For the purposes of calculation, a
true positive is defined as correctly identifying an employee,
and a true negative would be correctly classifying a profile as
a non-employee according to the roster page information.
Fig. 2 plots precision and recall for individual trials. Given
the low base rate of confirmed employees (20 out of 3753),
this would appear to be acceptable performance. Although
the mediocre precision of the method remains concerning,
this may be in part explained by real new or ex-employees
who are not listed on the roster, or individuals which could
be functionally as critically involved with the company as an
employee. The coverage of known employees is effective
across the evaluation.
A decision tree classifier was chosen so that the resulting
model could be easily examined and understood by penetra-
tion testers, and because it is easy to build good decision trees
on small training datasets. A random forests classifier was also
trialled on the data, producing better precision over valida-
tion runs (0.67) but at the cost of greatly reduced recall (0.08),
making its overall f1 performance much worse (0.14), whilst
also sacrificing comprehensibility of the model.
4.2. Probabilistic identity resolution across multiple OSNs
Once an employee’s profile has been identified, a social engi-
neer will benefit from gathering as much of their online
footprint as possible, gathering more context to use in attacks
against them. A means of doing this would be to identify the
same individual on another online social network, in which
additional data may be available. Employees may, for example,
maintain both a professional Twitter account which adver-
tises their connection to their employer and a personal Facebook
account which does not. Resolving these two identities allows
the social engineer access to data available in the personal
account in attacks directed at their professional role within a
company.
Previous studies (Goga et al., 2013; Narayanan and Shmatikov,
2009) have shown that this process can be automated for re-
identification of individuals between certain social networks.
Our aim is specifically to resolve identities across multiple online
social networks, rather than between only two networks as is typical
in the literature.
4.2.1. Data source
Our classifier is trained and evaluated on a challenging real-
istic data set gathered via the Google+ social network. We
targeted our efforts on classifying links to other identities on
three of the largest online social networks: Facebook, Twitter
and LinkedIn.
The Google+ social network includes an “other profiles” at-
tribute which highlights profiles of the account holder on other
online social networks. Using a method adopted from Gonzalez
et al. (2013), we randomly sampled 1161 Google+ profiles from
the network.
For those profiles from this sample which included an “other
profiles” attribute, the referenced profile was downloaded to
4 Precision and recall are preferred to accuracy in cases with im-
balanced classes, as here, because otherwise it is easy to produce
misleadingly positive results by e.g. always predicting the major-
ity class (most profiles are not employees).
Fig. 2 – Individual cross-validation results for precision and
recall.
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the extent permitted by that social network’s API – acting only
as an application or developer account, with no effort made
at invasive methods such as issuing friend requests. These
results form positive examples of matches. To create the ap-
propriate conditions for classification, an automatic process
issued a search to each social network for the name of the
profile on Google+ from which the link was made – emulat-
ing the behaviour of a social engineer who has found only the
Google+ profile and is now seeking the same individual on other
networks. The profiles resulting from this search were col-
lected as negative examples.This sampling process is designed
to avoid biases in the dataset being used for evaluating this
component of the system, and is more fully described by
Edwards et al. (2016).
As is typical in record linkage efforts, classification was at-
tempted within blocks of probable matches. In this case the
blocks were defined by the search term used to retrieve the
negative examples, combined with the relevant positive ex-
amples revealed by the “other profiles” attribute of the Google+
profile. The final dataset consisted of a total of 8402 compari-
sons between profiles from Google+ and the three other
networks, including 89 positive matches – a base rate of just
over 1%.
Within each pair comparison, all of the subclassifiers de-
scribed below examined the available profile data on the pair
of profiles and reported their similarity estimate between [0,1],
producing a comparison vector of 8 ratings.Where data were
not available for an attribute, the classifier would respond with
a similarity of 0 – reflecting a real lack of similarity where the
data cannot be observed.
4.2.2. Features
A number of different features may identify the same person
on different media, so the approach taken here is an en-
semble classifier, which makes its decision about whether two
profiles can be matched based on the reported matches of sub-
classifiers working on specific profile features, as discussed
below.
In most cases more advanced methods exist which would
produce more accurate comparison results for each feature,
but our primary focus has been on employing unsupervised
methods which release us from the requirement of obtaining
training data for subclassifiers and which are relatively
computationally inexpensive.
Each subclassifier reports a confidence in the interval [0,1]
that the two profiles presented reflect the same person.These
features can then be weighted and combined with a logistic
regression model.
1. Name Subclassifiers
Names and usernames are some of the best identifying fea-
tures, and are near-ubiquitous in online services. As such, two
subclassifiers make use of names from user profiles.
a) The first subclassifier compares the proportion of name com-
ponents from each profile which are exactly matched in
another profile. For example, comparing a profile with the
name components “John” and “Hancock” and “@JHC” to
another with the components “John” and “Smith” and
“+JS202”would produce a 0 33. match due to the shared first
name. Conversely, comparing the second profile with a
profile with name components “John” and “Smith” and
“@JS_work” would produce an overlap of 0.66 due to a full
name match.
b) The second subclassifier returns a similarity measure based
on the edit distance between the two profiles’ most repre-
sentative names. For this we use the Damerau–Levenshtein
edit distance calculation, where the classifier’s similarity
measure is given as follows:
1 −
edit distance
longest string length
_
_ _
Continuing the example from above, the representative
names “John Hancock” and “John Smith”would produce a simi-
larity measure of 0 416. – an edit distance of 7 operations over
the 12 characters in the longest string. Conversely, compari-
son of the latter to “John J. Smith” would produce a similarity
measure of 0 833. , with a distance of 2 operations over the 12
characters in the longest string.
2. Profile Picture Subclassifier
Avatars are images selected by a user to convey their iden-
tity, and as such there is some reason to believe that users will
make use of the same image on different networks, and as such
it can be used to link their profiles.
The primary avatar image from each profile is resized to
comparable thumbnail dimensions, and then the Euclidean dis-
tance between the histogram of each thumbnail is computed.
This provides a simple visual comparison of the two images.
Although highly sensitive to translation, rotation and other
simple manipulations, the aim of this comparison is to deter-
mine if the avatar images are essentially identical.
3. Activity Time Subclassifier
The times at which a user updates their profile provide
behavioural clues about both their geographical location and
their habits and routine, both of which are useful in
identification.
We base our time comparison of profiles on the work of Atig
et al. (2014).Timestamps from updates to social media are sorted
into one of six four-hour bins whichmake up an activity profile.
Each slot in a profile is compared to a higher (20%) and lower
(8%) threshold of activity.Those slots with more than the upper
threshold’s proportion of activity are considered “high activ-
ity” slots for the profile, and those with less than the lower
threshold are considered “low activity” slots. If two profiles share
a high or low activity slot, this increases the rating of simi-
larity between the two profiles.
4. Writing Fingerprint Subclassifier
Writing style similarity can be highly useful in identifying
individuals, and the authorship analysis literature contains
many well-performing supervised solutions (e.g. Afroz et al.
(2014)).
27c om pu t e r s & s e cu r i t y 6 9 ( 2 0 1 7 ) 1 8 – 3 4
We analyse the textual content of posts made by each profile
by counting the usage of a number of function words. Func-
tion words are words such as “it”, “some”, “if” and “there”which
have little lexical meaning, but form the structure of sen-
tences. They can be highly indicative of writing style (Koppel
and Schler, 2003). Our method counts the proportion of text
from both profiles which is composed of any of a list of 70
common function words, and calculates the Euclidean dis-
tance between these proportions to quantify the similarity in
writing style.
5. Link Analysis Subclassifier
As well as writing style, matched content can reveal a simi-
larity or connection between individual profiles. Hyperlinks are
unique identifiers of content of interest in online docu-
ments. People sharing the same link are likely to have similar
interests or read the same news source, and may in fact be the
same person promoting a link of interest to different social
groups on their multiple social networking platforms.
We count the proportional overlap in the set of hyperlinks
found in the user-generated text associated with a profile.This
subclassifier thus captures the behaviour of users promoting
links of interest on multiple platforms.
6. Friends Subclassifier
A person’s social graph in one social network is likely to
resemble their social graph in another. We make use of this
to compare profiles bymatching the names of friends from both
profiles. Wherever a friend’s name in one profile matches a
friend’s name in another (according to the edit distancemethod
of subclassifier 1(a), and a threshold of 0.8 similarity), the simi-
larity is incremented, up to a maximumwhich would represent
all friends in one profile having a strong name-based match
in the other profile.
7. Geographic Subclassifier
Geographic location can be highly identifying, when the data
are made available in sufficient resolution.We create a list of
location pairs as the product of the known locations associ-
ated with two profiles, and evaluate whether each pair is “near”
the other, where “near” is defined as the haversine distance
between two long/lat points being below a threshold of 10 ki-
lometers. The total number of “near” pairs determines the
geographic similarity of the two profiles.
4.2.3. Method
The dataset of comparison vectors was divided into a strati-
fied 90:10 training/test set. A binomial logistic regression model
was fitted to the training data, including terms for interac-
tions between each of the subclassifier outputs, as we would
expect the subclassifiers to generally support each other.
4.2.4. Results
Threshold values were applied to the model’s output prob-
abilities to enable classification and produce precision and recall
measures, and the combined f1-score. A range of these values
for a sample iteration is presented in Table 2. For the pur-
poses of calculation, a true positive is defined as correctly
identifying a matched profile, and a true negative is correctly
identifying non-matched profiles. The italicised row 4 high-
lights the greatest f1-score of 0.615 at the threshold of 0.3, which
represents the optimum threshold with equal balance being
given to precision and recall. In this iteration, as in others, pre-
cision remains stable for a range of threshold values past 0.3,
suggesting that low model output probabilities are efficient at
capturing most of the non-matched accounts. The inclusion
of a threshold value of 0 highlights the difference between
model performance and the base rate for the data.
Taking this threshold, a stratified ten-fold cross-validation
found an average precision of 0.64 and recall of 0.46, for an average
f1-score of 0.51.TheAUROC for themodel remained high through
all iterations, with an average AUROC of 0.96. The ROC plot in
Fig. 3 compares the ROC curves from each iteration of the cross-
validation.The high AUROC figure indicates that the model has
good discriminative power, and that real identity matches score
much better on the model output than mappings to other af-
filiates. In comparison, Fig. 4 plots precision and recall over
cross-validation runs. The mean AUPRC is 0.48.
Table 2 – Precision, recall and f1-scores for classifier
thresholds between 0 and 0.9.
Threshold Precision Recall F1-score
0.0 0.01 1.0 0.02
0.1 0.25 0.625 0.357
0.2 0.44 0.5 0.471
0.3 0.8 0.5 0.615
0.4 0.8 0.5 0.615
0.5 0.8 0.5 0.615
0.6 0.8 0.5 0.615
0.7 0.8 0.5 0.615
0.8 0.8 0.5 0.615
0.9 0.75 0.375 0.5
Fig. 3 – ROC plots for model validation.
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Regarding features, the majority of the predictive power (as
derived by the regression model) was carried by the name, time
activity profile and avatar comparisons, along with their in-
teractions, but the link activity subclassifier was also highly
predictive.The network-based comparisons suffered from high
standard errors, while our stylometry and geography com-
parisons appear to have been too often lacking sufficient data
for comparison.
5. Application to critical infrastructure
organisations
Combining the automatic solution for identifying an
organisation’s employees with an identity resolution system
which can be applied across social networks allows for the col-
lection of rich data about the organisation’s employees. For a
human attacker, manually tracing the link between an
organisation’s website and its employees’ disparate social media
activity is not that difficult, but at the same time it would be
burdensome and intrusive for the organisation to replicate this
process as part of a recurring vulnerability assessment.
Our automated methods allow for a minimally invasive
social engineering vulnerability scan to be launched against
an organisation’s web presence. Starting with nothing but the
organisation’s homepage URL, it is possible to locate em-
ployee accounts and from there determine the availability of
names, photographs and activity information which would
greatly aid a social engineer.This information can then be used
as an appraisal of the organisation’s vulnerability to social en-
gineering, to complement the more detailed feedback a human
assessor might provide with a less intrusive measure of the
effectiveness of new policies and initiatives.
As a demonstration of the vulnerability which may be
exposed by the social media footprint of employers and em-
ployees, we ran an automated scan on the digital footprint of
multiple real critical infrastructure organisations: specifi-
cally, water, gas and electricity companies. This selection was
based on the increasing focus such organisations have re-
ceived over recent years, particularly with regard to their use
of industrial control systems (ICS), to monitor, control, and au-
tomate physical operational processes. To date this focus has
largely been attributed to technical shortcomings, demon-
strated in the sharp rise of disclosed vulnerabilities (Kaspersky
Lab, 2015), and neglecting the importance of social and
organisational factors. An initial step towards understanding
the potential impact of social engineering on ICS was dis-
cussed by Green et al. (2015); however this work focuses solely
on malicious emails, with vulnerability assessments achieved
through the use of interview data.
Using a fully automated procedure based on the systems
we have evaluated, we assessed the online footprint of these
companies, firstly to identify employees from amongst their
social media connections and secondly to gather those infor-
mation items we have identified (with reference to Table 1) as
important to social engineers targeting the company via these
employees.
The input in each case was the URL for the target compa-
ny’s website.The website was crawled and the content scraped
– amongst the information extracted were contact details such
as email addresses and phone numbers, but most important
were URLs directed at the company’s social media presence.
Any such URLs were detected and resolved to the indicated
account, information on which was then retrieved via the ap-
propriate social network API; where no social media account
at all could be found, the run was terminated. From these ac-
counts, lists of affiliated profiles were collected, and our
decision-tree classifier identified employees from amongst this
set. Searches were issued for the employee profile display names
on each of the four networks, and the trained logistic regres-
sion model was used to identify any likely matches to the
indicated employee profiles, joining this information to the
stored profile on that employee. The output for each
organisation was a summary of the number of important social
engineering information items available. For employee items,
each category of information was only counted once per person
(i.e. recovering multiple names or status posts does not inflate
the count).
As broken down in Table 3, our employee identification
method filtered the total of 15,551 affiliate profiles down to 128
employee profiles.With regard to the bootstrap and accentua-
tor totals listed:
• employee names were extracted from both the website and
connected social media presences;
• email addresses and phone numbers were extracted from
the organisational website using pattern-matching (checks
were also made for additional contact data from social
media, but none was found);
• whether activity information was available was judged based
on whether multiple posts per day were available for a sig-
nificant proportion of each employee’s observed timeline;
• documentation was counted via the presence of PDF files
in the organisational website;
• information on friends, textual updates and photos were
extracted from social media profiles.
Fig. 4 – PR plots for model validation.
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Alongside bootstrap data specific to the company’s own
online footprint, for each of these employees, enough bootstrap-
threshold data was automatically extracted from their online
profiles to enable a targeted attack, and multiple accentuat-
ing information items were available. The bootstrap figures
reported in Table 3 separate those instances where a boot-
strap information item was available on an employee profile
(E) from the bootstrap information items which were ex-
tracted directly from the organisation’s website (O). In all cases,
the organisational website provided a greater volume of boot-
strap data, although the categories were for the most part non-
overlapping, with activity information only available via social
media.The presence of documentation rather than its volume
counted towards the organisational total for bootstrap items.
Organisational footprints contained the most direct contact
information – all phone numbers and email addresses re-
trieved were automatically mined from organisational websites.
Employee social media profiles provided a complement to this,
turning up large amounts of visual, text, activity and social in-
formation for most individual employees.
The information items revealed by the employee profiles
of these companies were best-suited to email-based attacks.
While email addresses themselves were only found on
organisation websites, social media profiles combined neces-
sary attack information – the employee’s name – with their
identification as an employee of the company, and other in-
formation which would allow social engineers to craft a
phishing attack to the employee’s personal interests (e.g. a link
purporting to be for a competition to win something the em-
ployee has an interest in) or social circle (e.g. imitating a
coworker or personal friend). It is worth noting that many email-
based attacks could also be delivered via social media
communications.
Phone-based attacks were also given strong support – the
combination of a phone number retrieved from the compa-
ny’s website and knowledge of the names of employees and
other context allows social engineers to talk their targets into
compromising organisational security.The lack of direct phone
numbers to contact employees is the only hindrance to such
attacks.
On-site attacks are the least well provided for by auto-
matic examination of public OSINT items, with challenges of
inferring a company’s supplier or partner organisations hin-
dering some attack schemes. Social media does however often
provide the activity information about employees which reveals
their work routine, allowing social engineers to identify, for
example, periods when employees would be out to lunch and
buildings could be more easily accessed.The availability of geo-
location data is also significant for these attacks, as recent work
demonstrates (Gan and Jenkins, 2015).
6. Automated scanning as a mitigation
strategy
Prevention of security breaches resulting from social engineer-
ing attacks is notoriously difficult, with human error or human
manipulation playing a large factor in the majority of high-
profile cases. As shown, OSINT provides a key component to,
and assists, many social engineering attacks. Currently, for an
organisation to assess its own online footprint, including the
presence of its employees, and the risk this poses, intensive
manual effort is required, and usually the expertise of a social
engineering penetration tester. Furthermore, this process must
be repeated at regular intervals as information and content are
constantly updated. The automated vulnerability assessment
tool developed as a product of this research is able to provide
an assessment of an organisation’s social engineering attack
surface, as demonstrated in Section 5.We propose that such a
tool is useful for organisations to utilise as part of an ongoing
assessment of their risk from online footprints and OSINT as-
sisting potential social engineering attacks.To demonstrate the
tool as a vulnerability scanner and mitigation strategy, we at-
tached a simple automated reporting mechanism to the tool,
which provides information such as:
• Which organisation-level websites and social media pro-
files were identified.
• The number of people found affiliated to the company, and
how many of these were detected as employees.
• A list of the OSINT item types collected and quantities (as
in Table 3), along with a high level description of the types
of attack these could enable.
Table 3 – Outcomes for target companies. E is total bootstrap information extracted from employees social media
profiles, O is total bootstrap information extracted from the organisation website.
Targets Bootstrap Accentuator
Affiliates Employees Name Email Phone Activity Docs E O Friends Text Photos Total
Water 1 1792 29 29 61 148 25 1431 54 210 26 26 29 81
2 502 2 2 9 85 0 692 2 95 0 0 2 2
3 3258 17 17 38 76 12 1465 29 115 14 13 17 44
4 4483 44 44 45 196 30 90 74 321 33 32 44 109
5 508 3 3 14 41 2 683 5 56 3 3 3 9
Gas 1 500 1 1 27 58 1 629 2 86 1 1 1 3
2 930 11 11 14 31 7 341 18 46 9 7 11 27
3 471 5 5 18 26 3 352 8 45 4 3 5 12
4 463 3 3 25 74 3 197 6 100 2 3 3 8
Power 1 1815 12 12 52 78 11 16 23 131 12 12 12 36
2 454 0 - 0 3 - 0 - 3 - - - -
3 475 1 1 10 6 1 639 2 17 1 1 1 3
4 1374 10 10 37 79 8 27 18 117 9 8 10 27
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• A list of mitigation strategies to consider, prioritised by the
list of OSINT items found.These were informed by the expert
interviews described in Section 3. These include:
– Security awareness training.
– Revised security policies and practices.
– Network restrictions.
– Company website review.
– Social engineering penetration test.
In order to assess the usefulness of the final tool in a real-
world environment, we conducted trials with 5 organisations,
who we approached for their cooperation. Anonymity was
assured for each organisation.The organisations provided URLs
to use as input to the tool, and were then in turn presented
with a report.
The organisations taking part in the study were: [label=.]
A. The IT services department (c. 150 employees) of a large
organisation (c. 5000 employees). The head of IT secu-
rity was interviewed.
B. A small legal firm (c. 50 employees). The Chief Execu-
tive Officer was interviewed.
C. A small IT security company (c. 20 employees).The man-
aging director was interviewed.
D. A small-to-medium legal firm (c. 100 employees). The
head of IT was interviewed.
E. A small IT company (c. 10 employees). The head of se-
curity was interviewed.
Different numbers of affiliates and employees were de-
tected for each organisation, as reported in Table 4. Note that
the size of the organisation (in terms of estimated number of
employees) does not always relate to the number of detected
affiliates; this may be due to different social media activity and
practices by each organisation. The vulnerabilities reported
varied for each company also, although some were common
for all. Common items highlighted included updates during
office hours and high social media activity. More variable items
included direct email addresses and phone numbers, and lo-
cation information.
Once provided with the report, each organisation was in-
terviewed at length to garner their feedback on the findings,
and its usefulness to the organisation. Questions included “Have
the results of the scanner affected your views on publicly avail-
able information on your company and staff?” and “What do
you intend to do now that you have the results?”
In terms of altering perception, there were no immediate
indications that the scanner produced results which would
shock an organisation into adopting a more strict security
culture. However, some companies admitted that the risk factors
analysed heightened their awareness of certain risks which they
were previously not aware of.This was especially true for those
with minimal security knowledge and background.
The tool’s output was seen to be of benefit for highlight-
ing potential issues, and useful for supporting the argument
for, and implementation of, future mitigation strategies. Fur-
thermore, most companies stated they would like to use the
tool on a regular basis to evaluate progress and the effect of
mitigation strategies, e.g. Company E stated:
We can use this to benchmark ourselves and include this
in our monthly staff meetings to check progress on our own
cyber security and risk of social engineering. That should
help to bring a cyber security culture within the company.
And Company A stated:
Once you’ve run things and delivered training, it’s good to
use that as a metric to see how successful that was and how
much of an impact that’s made.
It is important to note that we do not name individuals in
our results, thus maintaining anonymity, and only report ag-
gregate figures. Some of the feedback indicated that
organisations would likemore specific information. For example,
Company A stated:
Maybe give some examples that are specific to [the
organisation]. If I’m looking at [this tool] from a CEO point
of view, to be able to identify this [example] to the statis-
tic and say this person said such and such, I think it’ll hit
home a bit more.
Company A also felt that the outputs of the scanner would
bemore useful if each department within the organisation could
be distinguished. While this still provides a level of anonym-
ity, it can reveal a more detailed insight and could allow
management or staff responsible for security to focus on de-
partments which seem high risk:
Because not everybody is forward facing so I’d be less both-
ered about them.
7. Discussion
7.1. Automated social engineering scans vs. penetration
testing
It seems clear that an automated social engineering vulner-
ability scanner, such as that developed for this research, is of
use for organisations as an initial, and ongoing, assessment
of risk from their online footprints and OSINT. The auto-
mated scan is clearly less expensive to run than a manual
analysis, with adequately thorough manual scans taking an
individual hours to perform. The scan can be run with no
human intervention with simple initial variables set. It is also
Table 4 – Summary of affiliates and employees detected
for study organisations.
Organisation Estimated
employees
Affiliates
detected
Employees
detected
A 150 612 13
B 50 1366 5
C 20 355 8
D 100 469 0
E 10 1948 6
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possible for an automated scan to cover many more individu-
als than a human could reasonably analyse, and thus potentially
find more OSINT items of risk.
A social engineering vulnerability scanner could not, and
should not, replace a social engineering penetration test, much
like an automated vulnerability scanner (e.g., website scan-
ners) could not adequately replace a full penetration test.
However, there is scope for both to be used alongside each other.
A vulnerability scanner provides cheap and simple results to
perform an initial assessment of an organisation’s vulnerabil-
ity to social engineering. It may provide an indication to what
extent a full penetration test involving social engineering is
necessary. It also provides important assessment to small- and
medium-sized organisation that may not be able to afford a
full penetration test, providing pointers to mitigation strate-
gies that any organisation could consider putting in place.
7.2. Reporting granularity
An interesting discussion point is the granularity provided to
distinguish individuals in the report. Some companies re-
quested further breakdown into employees from individual
departments – this could also be applied to different roles.
However, it would be possible with the data collected to go
further and produce a list naming individuals who are con-
sidered high-risk or who exhibit specific OSINT items.Whilst
technically possible, there are ethical and moral issues to con-
sider here. Singling out individuals in this way may highlight
targeted mitigation strategies and alert an individual to issues
he or she may not be aware of. But it may also cause distress
and lead to disciplinary action. It would seem to be particu-
larly unreasonable to single out individuals for risky behaviour
when awareness training has not been provided and relevant
policies have not been set out prior to the scan taking place.
A similar issue is raised during social engineering penetra-
tion testing – should an individual who is found to pose a
security risk (e.g. gives away a password) be named to man-
agement?Views on this seem to be mixed, although anecdotal
evidence suggests that human resources departments would
raise serious concerns about such practice. It should be noted
however that amalicious attacker using social engineering tech-
niques is unlikely to deliberate on the issue, so from a security
standpoint the benefit of identifying the precise “point of failure”
can be seen. As an analogy, in a technical penetration test it
would not be satisfactory if a report stated that one input field
on the company’s website is vulnerable to SQL injection without
specifying precisely which input field on which webpage.
7.3. Dual-use concerns
As with any vulnerability scanner, the prototype can be used
for harm as well as good, with vulnerabilities highlighted to
potential attackers as well the organisation. This is mitigated
somewhat by aggregated statistics being presented rather than
specific details about vulnerable individuals, as discussed.Also,
the tool does not present any information that could not be
gleaned through manual analysis by an attacker. Indeed a de-
termined attacker would be likely to find additional useful
information and specific individuals to target. One conceiv-
able misuse of the tool would be to automatically scan a large
number of organisations, and pick out those particularly vul-
nerable to social engineering attacks, or particular ploys. The
time taken to run each scan,mainly due to rate limiting, would
mitigate this approach somewhat. It is hoped that the devel-
opment and use of the tool can highlight OSINT and social
engineering risk to a wider range of organisations who may
not have considered such risks adequately before, and also
provide training opportunities,mitigation strategies and bench-
mark assessments of online footprints. All of the data analysed
by our tool is public, so an attacker could write a similar tool
of their own to perform the same task.We make our tool freely
available to organisations in order to counter this concern –
so that they can harden their security posture against such po-
tential attacks.
8. Conclusion
Social engineering attacks are a potent threat to organisational
security, and open-source intelligence provides vital data which
enable attackers to carry them out. In this paper we have used
expert guidance to determine which information is of practi-
cal value to social engineers, and demonstrated that significant
elements of such attacks can be automated in a passivemanner.
Further, we have demonstrated that this approach is fruitful.
Employees can be identified amongst large online crowds and
selected for automatic data harvesting, and when they are, large
amounts of information valuable to social engineers can be ex-
tracted. This extends to information on profiles which the
employee does not necessarily realise can be connected to their
work identity. As the Internet of Things and other media trends
expand the range of personal information which is made avail-
able about individuals, organisations must become increasingly
aware of the threat vector which leads from seemingly in-
nocuous personal digital habits to compromise of their staff
and systems.
While this has implications as a threat to organisational se-
curity, this technology can also be used as a tool to harden an
organisation’s online presence. To reinforce mitigation strat-
egies, we contribute an automated tool that can be used by
penetration testers to passively examine the vulnerability of
an organisation, which may be used as a means of evaluat-
ing the real effectiveness of organisational mitigation strategies
such as training events and updated policies.
8.1. Further work
Social engineering attacks bridge an employee’s personal life
with their professional role, and as a result vulnerability as-
sessments must likewise do so – managing this without being
unduly aggressive is a delicate balance to strike. In this work
we have taken the stance that reporting summaries of infor-
mation which is freely available on public networks would not
be overly invasive of employee privacy, but further examina-
tion of expectations could well be a profitable area for study.
Much may rest on how resulting vulnerabilities are reported
– can employee-level vulnerabilities be reported in good con-
science to enable targeted interventions?
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We have highlighted the use of a passive vulnerability
assessment as a mitigation strategy to help organisations to
reduce their social engineering attack surface. This could be
combined with more active countermeasures, such as
phishing email susceptibility tests as described by Finn and
Jakobsson (2007), or by creating honeypot social media ac-
counts in a similar manner to that described by Lee et al. for
uncovering social spammers (Lee et al., 2010). Furthermore,
Kotson and Schulz (2015) and Dewan et al. (2014) propose
that organisations could use natural language processing
techniques to maintain awareness of their online footprint,
to be compared with received phishing emails, allowing
identification of collection of OSINT by an attacker, and
potential early warning of an Advanced Persistent Threat
(APT). During the course of our interviews, experts consis-
tently highlighted awareness training as the best way to
combat social engineering attacks. Whilst some technical
countermeasures were recommended by these experts, solu-
tions focused on detecting the payload of social engineering
attacks (e.g. domain whitelisting/blacklisting, domain moni-
toring for typo squatting), rather than detection of more
sophisticated social engineering attacks. Solutions to detect
such sophisticated attacks are emerging (Aggarwal et al.,
2014), but still fall short of successfully detecting against
sophisticated text-based attacks.
Our technical contributions could be improved. Our ap-
proach has been to start from simple and readily deployable
methods which can be included in a tool. The precision of our
employee distinguishing systemmay be improved with the in-
troduction of a richer feature set and better training data, and
alternative classifiers could well prove more suitable for the
challenge than the C5.0 decision-tree. We are already aware
that better-performing feature sets are available for cross-
platform identity resolution (e.g. Goga et al. (2013)), and these
would be fruitful areas for improvement.
Our current implementation focuses on application to the
dominant Western, English-language social networks, but
the majority of the general process generalises well to other
social networks and other languages. For other English-
language social networks, the tool can be extended through
the development of a module following the template used by
the existing four modules, which extract profile information
into a standard internal representation. When crossing lan-
guages, structural information such as hyperlinks and user
relationships can be managed by the existing framework, but
the writing fingerprint subclassifier in particular will need to
be updated to reflect function-word lists for the target lan-
guages, and informed about the appropriate word-list to use
for a given corpus. The existing modules could also be
redesigned around a web-scraping approach, to bypass autho-
rised API limitations, while feeding into the same core
process.
Finally, further end-user evaluations of our tool would help
tune operation and output to meet the needs of penetration
testers.While certain elements of an online footprint require
human attention for their value to be revealed, the ability to
automatically quantify certain threats could act as a force mul-
tiplier for effective security testing, but this requires more
attention and development than typically emerges from re-
search tools.
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